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The Shifting Dynamics of International Reserve Currencies 
Abstract 
With the recognition by the IMF of the Chinese renminbi as an international reserve currency in 2015, it is 
important to understand the modern influence of reserve currencies. We use currency exchange rate data 
and apply modified workhorse regression models to assign each country’s gross domestic product at 
purchasing power parity to a reserve currency bloc in order to obtain a global sphere of influence for each 
reserve currency. We find that the United States retains its dominance but faces challenges from the 
renminbi and the euro in recent years as the international monetary system becomes tri-polar. 
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Introduction 
 
A. Statement of Purpose 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relative decline of the United States 
dollar (USD) as a reserve currency. In particular, we want to quantify the use of 
the renminbi (RMB) as an upcoming reserve currency and predict its future 
impact. Our work seeks to provide an updated view of the international monetary 
system and compare these results to what previous researchers have found. This is 
extremely important as the Chinese currency has gained more recognition in 
recent years, there has been a very large increase in Chinese investments and 
trade, and there has been a shifting political climate globally.   
 
B. Background 
 
Leading up to the 1950’s the United States did not have the dominant reserve 
currency. Great Brittan held this distinction. As seen in Figure 1, that changed 
drastically and the dollar has been dominant ever since. However, in recent years 
we have seen a rise in other currencies to rival the dollar. This work will 
investigate the global influence of the major reserve currencies including the 
RMB, and analyze the impacts that a paradigm shift will have on the global 
economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1- Currency Composition of Globally Disclosed Foreign Exchange 
Reserves in percent. 
 
Source: Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl (2016) 
1
Righi: The Shifting Dynamics of International Reserve Currencies
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2019
 Reserve currencies are held by countries’ central banks in order to be used 
in international transactions. This includes investments and debt obligations. They 
are also used to manage exchange rates. Reserve currencies have long been 
studied to gain a better understanding of international finance and trade. 
Throughout most of the modern day history of the international monetary system 
the United States has played a dominant role. There are large economic 
implications for the United States having the dominant reserve currency. One 
such implication is that there is a very high demand for the USD and countries 
have a significant interest in seeing the dollar do well. The US has what is known 
as “exorbitant privilege;” that is, it will not have a balance of payments problem 
as all of its transactions are done in the USD. In addition, since the United States 
controls the money supply, it benefits from seigniorage or the value gained by 
minting money. However, there are some negatives associated with being the 
dominant reserve currency. This would include increased spending, and possibly 
cheaper imports hurting domestic firms. However, being the major reserve 
currency is in large part beneficial.  
Therefore, it is extremely important to study the international monetary 
system and to examine the shifts that occur over time. The international reserve 
system as a whole can be criticized with an overreliance on the dollar, and the 
United States unfairly taking advantage of the benefits of such a role for the USD. 
An example can be seen with the large amounts of spending the United States had 
in the Vietnam War, which led to the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. 
Conversely, the USD can provide stability, liquidity, and safe assets in times of 
financial crises. It provides a reliable network and a common currency that most 
countries use in international exchanges and transactions.     
Despite these arguments, there has been a push for diversification. In fact, 
recent years have seen that there has been diversification in the international 
monetary system particularly with the rise of the euro leading to a bi-polar 
system. We would like to examine China’s role in this increased diversification, 
particularly in the years after 2015, when the RMB was officially recognized, by 
the IMF, as a reserve currency in a political climate characterized by a Chinese 
push for global power and a United States shift toward nationalism in the age of 
Trump. As the reserve system shifts to a tri-polar system there are many economic 
implications for the United States in terms of its exorbitant privilege.    
 
C. Previous Methods 
 
Much of the work that has previously been published studies the shares and 
explicit use of various currencies globally to gauge each currency’s role and 
influence. For example Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl (2016) analyze network and 
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policy effects by looking at the size of the shares of reported reserves. Although 
the work does a great job of expanding the data set back in time, there is still little 
data for the RMB. That is because the IMF’s reporting of the relevant data for the 
RMB began relatively recently. Furthermore, Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl show 
that there are a lot of holes in IMF reporting, and that despite a relatively good job 
of plugging, it still creates problems when combining data sets from various 
sources over a long time frame.  
 This then begs the essential question of this research. How do we 
accurately measure the RMB’s influence as a reserve currency in an international 
monetary system that has recently shown signs of diversifying? To answer this we 
turn to work done by Tovar and Nor (2018) introducing an alternative approach to 
measuring the influence of reserve currencies than the typical one found in other 
literature. More specifically, calculating the influence that each major currency 
bloc has on other currencies. This work, covering data from 1969-2015, will serve 
as the foundation for our research as we focus on a more recent time period for 
the reasons discussed in the previous sections. 
  Tovar and Nor study currency co-movements of national currencies with 
reserve currencies to determine what reserve currency bloc each national currency 
is a part of. It is then possible to calculate the global share of GDP that each 
reserve currency influences. The results indicate that the USD is dominant with a 
global share of GDP of about 40 percent. Interestingly, this is followed by the 
RMB with about a 30 percent share of global GDP. Finally the Euro holds around 
20 percent. This indicates that the sphere of influence of the RMB is larger than 
otherwise thought in work analyzing reserve currency shares. In addition, the 
RMB going into 2015 already has an established influence globally. 
In order to calculate each sphere of influence Tovar and Nor built on 
Frankel and Weis’s (1994) methodology for analysis using workhorse regressions. 
This methodology is argued to have some drawbacks particularly with the fact 
that the RMB has been pegged to the USD in the past, which presents a 
collinearity problem. So to address these concerns the researchers employ Kawai 
and Pontines’ (2016) approach to analyzing the sphere of influence of the RMB. 
However, they do this globally and not restricted to Asia. 
To measure the global effect the researchers calculated a relative and 
absolute sphere of influence for each of the major reserve currency to gather an in 
depth look at the historical and recent state of the international monetary system. 
This is groundbreaking work that we look to expand upon by incorporating the 
most recent three-year period. We will also look to duplicate their results and 
corroborate their findings. 
The work found that the transition from a bi-polar reserve system to a tri-
polar system is well underway. However, the USD still, as is the case historically, 
plays the dominant role. A lot of the RMB’s influence is attributed to BRICs 
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currencies. BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China. These countries are 
grouped because they are at a similar stage of economic development. 
Interestingly, the influence of the RMB is more on BRICS currencies as opposed 
to playing a central role in Asia. Part of our work will be devoted to seeing if in 
the last few years this makeup of the RMB’s influence has changed. That is, we 
will look to see if the RMB dominance is extended beyond the BRICS currencies. 
With that said, the RMB dominance in these countries is extremely important. We 
expect that as these countries continue to grow, so will the role of the RMB 
internationally. 
In addition to studying the influence of each major reserve currency, the 
work also analyzed what factors play an important role in determining a 
currency’s influence. What was found was that networking effects play a big role. 
In addition the size of a country matters, and, as we stated before, China has seen 
unprecedented growth in recent history. Finally debt levels hurt the size of blocs 
and current account surpluses undermine them. These works lay the groundwork 
for how our research will be conducted.  
 
 
 
Methods 
 
A. Data 
 
Our work uses exchange rate data as reported by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The IMF has near global membership, as it is comprised of 189 countries. 
The IMF’s main goal is to ensure the stability of the international monetary 
system. They also provide reliable, up to date economic data. For exchange rate 
data we use end of period monthly data reported by the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics. Our model uses exchange rates per USD for reasons 
explained in the next section. To visualize the data that will be used for this 
research, log scale exchange rates in terms of USD can be seen in Figure 2.    
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Figure 2- Log scale end of period monthly exchange rates per USD for 2006M1-
2018M11. 
 
Source: IMF  
 
  
We chose our time frame from 2006M1-2018M11 for multiple reasons. 
First, we see very low correlation between the United States dollar and the 
renminbi. We found the correlation to be .546, which is extremely encouraging 
for the use of this time period in our results. This is especially true considering 
that there were time periods where the RMB was directly pegged to the USD with 
a perfect correlation of 1.This also implies this is actually a period of relatively 
free floating for the renminbi backing up historical accounts. As we will discuss 
later, this greatly helps to deal with the multicollinearity of our model. The second 
reason we used this time period is that our work looks to paint an up to date 
picture of the global influence of major currencies. Since China’s currency started 
to become a large global player during this time, it is imperative that it is the 
focus of our study. Finally, this allows for a large sample of countries with 
complete data. We use a representative sample of 149 countries to estimate the 
global influence of the reserve currencies. Countries whose data were incomplete 
were removed from our sample. In addition, we argue our 155 data points are 
sufficient to create a respectable sample size for the model.    
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Our data for gross domestic product at purchasing-power parity (GDP-
PPP) are obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. We use the 
individual share of GDP-PPP an individual country has in a given year. This is 
annual data reported at the end of each period. Our work uses the global shares of 
GDP-PPP for 2018. This is to ensure that our results reflect the time period that 
we are using, as well as to provide a clear scope of the current outlook.  
 
B. Model 
 
This work utilizes models employed by Tovar and Nor (2018). These models are 
difference in log workhorse regression models that were initially used by Frankel 
and Wei (1994). They are designed to analyze co-movement of international 
currencies with the major reserve currencies. However, there were some 
drawbacks to Frankel and Wei’s equation. Namely, the biggest problem was the 
fact that the effects of the RMB were not measured. This at the time was 
understandable, but as the RMB began to play the role of a major reserve 
currency, it needed to be included. Therefore Tovar and Nor use a modified 
approach used by Kawai and Pontines (2016). This model measured the effect of 
the RMB. Kawai and Pontines’ model only focused on a localized region in Asia 
in their analysis. Therefore, Tovar and Nor extended this model on the global 
scale. They were the first researchers to do a global scale of this kind of analysis. 
We will employ the same equation that Tovar and Nor used in their work. Our 
work will then show an updated picture of the various reserve currencies on the 
global scale in the age of Trump and post official recognition of the RMB as a 
reserve currency by the IMF. The model is expressed in the following form:   
 
Δlog(x/USD)t= β0 + β1Δlog(EUR/USD)t + β2Δlog(GBP/USD)t + 
β3Δlog(JPY/USD)t + β4Δlog(RMB/USD)t + εt 
(1) 
 
 
where x is an individual country and USD serves as our choice for the numeraire 
currency. Our dependent variable is the logarithmic change in of a country’s 
currency in terms of the USD. The regression coefficients represent the weight 
each major reserve currency has on currency x. Since we use difference in log we 
can calculate the “inferred” United States effect. This is done by the constraint  
β5 = 1 - β1 - β2 - β3 - β4.  
 Tovar and Nor (2018) use equation (1) throughout their work but express 
collinearity problems with the RMB as it was pegged to the USD for a long 
period of time. They address these problems by employing a second two-stage 
model. In this work we use an alternative method to address these problems. That 
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is, we use a sample period in which the RMB was not pegged to the USD. As 
stated before, our period will range from 2006-2018. By choosing the USD as our 
numeraire currency, as well as leaving it out of our initial model and calculating 
the effect afterwards, we are able to alleviate the collinearity problem.    
 Our methods use a comprehensive list of 149 countries to create a 
balanced sample to estimate effects. We will repeat equation (1) 149 times 
running the regression once for each country in our sample. In each case we will 
note the highest coefficient in the model. Country x will then be placed into the 
reserve currency bloc for whichever has the highest coefficient. So by calculating 
the weight of each reserve currency on each individual country we can calculate 
the sphere of influence each reserve currency has. We obtain the size of reserve 
currency blocs by assigning a country’s GDP-PPP reported by the IMF global 
outlook data to the country whose reserve currency has the greatest influence on 
that country’s currency, as found from the coefficients in (1).    
 Our methods serve as an alternative to traditional studies about reserve 
currencies. Typical studies look mostly as shares of reserve currencies and factors 
that affect reserve currencies. Our methods are beneficial in that we can measure 
the direct effect the reserve currencies themselves have internationally. They are 
also useful in that they not only paint a picture on the global scale with currency 
blocs, but we can also point to individual countries and how each currency is 
directly impacted. In addition, our methods allow for measuring the effect of the 
RMB both prior to and post being officially recognized as a reserve currency by 
the IMF in 2015.  
 
 
 
Results 
 
A. Global Impacts 
  
Based on our regression results for each country individually we assigned global 
shares of GDP-PPP to each reserve currency. These are known as currency blocs. 
We constructed our reserve currency blocs in two ways. The first were absolute 
currency blocs. This involved assigning each country to a reserve currency solely 
based on which reserve currency accounted for the most movement in that 
particular country’s currency. The next were relative currency blocs. In this case 
each country’s global share of GDP-PPP was split between each of the major 
reserve currencies based on the coefficients in each individual regression. 
  First we will discuss the absolute currency blocs. The results can be seen 
in Table 1. About 5% of the global share of GDP-PPP was unaccounted for. This 
is for two reasons. The first is that not every country had GDP-PPP data. The 
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second is that not every country had complete data on exchange rates from 2006-
2018. However we feel that this is a very good representation of the current state 
of the international monetary fund. We find, like Tovar and Nor (2018), that the 
international monetary system is now tri-polar. China has a strong foothold in the 
global economy. Surprisingly we find that in this time period the United States 
has a share of 31.21 which is less than the 40.7 Tovar and Nor found from 2011-
2015. Interestingly we do not see an increased share for China. They found the 
Chinese share to be 32.5 where we find it to be 30.07. It is Europe that sees the 
increased share from 19.5 to 27.43. That leads us to believe that as the dollar loses 
grip in the international monetary system, it will be the euro that makes up this 
ground. 
  
US Europe China Japan UK 
Absolute Share 31.2 27.4 30.1 4.2 2.2 
Tovar and Nor 
(2018) 
40.1 19.5 32.5 4.8 2.5 
 
Table 1- Absolute currency bloc of global shares of GDP-PPP in percent (Approx. 
5% of global GDP-PP is unaccounted for in our work) 
 
We then turn to the relative currency blocs. The results can be seen in 
Table 2. We see similar results as the absolute bloc in that there is a tri-polar 
system. However, we see in this case that the US bloc is not the dominant one and 
that in fact the Chinese bloc is. This is very surprising. However, we do not see 
these results as reliable as the absolute blocs. This is mostly because they are 
much more vulnerable to error in our estimations. For example in the relative bloc 
we find Japan to have 3.22% of global GDP-PPP, however this is less than its 
own GDP. This is because we are relying on the culmination of many 
insignificant coefficients in which many appear as negative. This is opposed to 
basing the blocs on strongly significant coefficients like we do for the absolute 
bloc. 
  
US Europe China Japan UK 
Relative Share 25.2 28.2 31.8 3.2 6.8 
Tovar and Nor 
(2018) 
39 20.3 31.6 5.3 4 
 
Table 2- Relative currency bloc of global shares of GDP-PPP in percent (Approx. 
5% of global GDP-PP is unaccounted for) 
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Our results have major impacts on the global scale. Figure 3 shows a map 
graph for each absolute currency bloc. Clearly neighboring countries are more 
prone to being included in a major bloc, with some exceptions. This includes 
Mexico and Canada which Tovar and Nor (2018) find to be in the US bloc. This 
is another example of the decline of the Unites States global economic influence 
in the past few years. It is clear that there are three major reserve currency blocs 
and that the international monetary system in its current state is tri-polar.  
 
 
Figure 3- Map graph of absolute major reserve blocs. Red represents the US, 
yellow China, orange Europe, dark green UK, light green Japan, and white 
countries do not have complete data.   
 
 We also have to consider the argument that we need to remove the 
country’s own GDP-PPP from the bloc. By subtracting this out from the absolute 
shares we see that the United States and Europe become virtually even at 16% of 
global GDP-PPP. China goes to 11% and both the UK and Japan go to 0%. This 
does not change the overall scope of our results. It does however, bode in favor of 
Europe, which throughout this analysis has shown strong upticks in comparison to 
the work of Tovar and Nor.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Our results show a tri-polar international monetary system. This is directly in line 
with the results found by Tovar and Nor (2018). However, we see an increase in 
the influence of the Euro over our time frame from 2006-2018 in addition to a 
decrease in the dominance of the dollar. We see geographical changes such as 
Canada and Mexico changing from the US bloc to the Euro bloc and Chinese bloc 
respectively. We additionally found that the Chinese renminbi has a bloc of 
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around 30% of the global share of GDP-PPP. Surprisingly with the recognition of 
the Chinese RMB as a reserve currency in 2015, there does not seem to be a rise 
in its sphere of influence attributable to that recognition. It is the Euro whose 
influence seems to grow as the dollar’s influence falls. We find that in absolute 
terms the United States still dominates the international monetary system, but in 
relative terms its influence has declined. 
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